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The purpose of this paper is to investigate vulnerability to financial contagion in a set of expanding 
emerging markets of the Middle East and North Africa, during seven episodes of international 
financial crisis. Using Fry & Baur (2005) fixed-effect panel approach, we significantly reject the 
hypothesis of a joint regional contagion. However, using a battery of bivariate contagion tests based 
on Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Corsetti (2002), and Favero and Giavazzi (2002), we find evidence 
that each of the investigated markets suffered from contagion at least once out of the seven 
investigated crises. In conformity with the literature, our results suggest that the probability of being 
affected by contagion seems to increase as the MENA markets develop in size and liquidity, and 
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The joint increased international integration of emerging markets and the repeated incidence of 
financial crises in recent history have ignited a research agenda into the role of globally integrated 
capital markets in financial crises. More specifically, the concept of  ‘contagion’ as a conduit for 
capital market turmoil has become an important focus. Contagion can be defined as the transmission 
of unanticipated local shocks to another country or market, resulting in an increase in correlation 
during periods of financial crisis (Masson, 1999; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). The consequences of 
contagion can be staggering: for instance, real output losses during the Asian crisis have been 
estimated at 15% of GNP (IMF, 2001). These crisis episodes have clearly highlighted the risk inherent 
to capital market integration for emerging market economies. 
On the other hand, several studies suggested that global integration is beneficial to growth and 
employment. Models of international asset pricing under capital market segmentation usually predict 
that the integration of capital markets decreases the cost of capital as risk is internationally diversified 
(Stulz, 1999). Empirical work also suggests that liberalizing restrictions on international portfolio 
flows tends to enhance stock price liquidity, which in turns enhances productivity and ultimately affect 
economic growth (Levine, 2001; Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Patro and Wald, 2004). For emerging 
market economies, the co-existence of gains and risks associated to financial integration is inherent to 
the relationship uniting market integration and vulnerability to financial contagion.  More 
fundamentally, one might ask whether an optimal degree of financial integration exist, where an 
emerging market economy can reap the benefits of greater access to foreign capital without enduring 
the costs of contagion. 
The objective of this paper is to answer part of the question by investigating the vulnerability of the 
emerging markets of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to various episodes of financial crisis. 
As shown in table 1, the area has now overcome Latin America in terms of average market 
capitalization, liquidity and number of listed firms. However, only since the 1990’s have the MENA 
countries embarked on financial liberalization policies, and with different timings  (see FEMISE, 
2005). As a consequence, the MENA area actually encompasses markets of various sizes and maturity, from the largely capitalized stock markets of Turkey, Israel and Egypt, to the more thinly traded 
markets of Morocco, Tunisia and Lebanon.  
Previous research in the MENA stock markets has shown that these markets display opportunities for 
international diversification by displaying evidence for international segmentation and predictability 
(Lagoarde-Segot&Lucey, 2005(a),(b); Girard ,2004). However, to our knowledge, there is no 
empirical evidence on the transmission of international financial crisis in these markets. This paper 
constitutes a first attempt to fill this gap in the literature. The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 presents the methodology, the crisis definition and the dataset. Section 3 discusses 
our findings, and section 4 draws together our conclusions.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
2. Methodology, Data and Crisis Identification  
 
2.1 Methodology 
There is now a reasonably large body of empirical work testing for the existence of contagion during 
financial crisis. The seminal methodology used to analyze simultaneously falling stock markets over 
breakdown periods was to compare correlation coefficient with a benchmark (Longin&Solnik, 1995; 
Karolyi & Stulz, 1996). However, it is now established that results from this approach can be biased. 
First, the presence of heteroscedasticity in the studied markets makes it impossible to draw robust 
conclusion from simple correlation coefficients. It has been shown that heteroscedasticity is a typical 
feature of crisis periods since the latter generally corresponding to an increase in volatility 
(Forbes&Rigobon, 2002). A second bias is that simple tests based on changes of coefficient can have 
low power (Dungey & Zhumabekova, 2001). Finally, bi-variate coefficient analysis implies that only 
pairs of markets can be analyzed, even though markets are part of a larger financial system 
(Baur&Fry, 2005). 
Several models of contagion have been developed over recent years in order to overcome the 
difficulties cited above (see Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez & Martin, 2004). These methodologies have relative merits and use a variety of econometric techniques. In order to investigate the issue of 
contagion in the Middle East and North Africa, we build up a battery of econometric tests that 
encompasses four of these, including the multivariate fixed effect panel approach of Baur&Fry (2005), 
the endogenous timing structural model approach of Favero&Giavazzi (2002), the Forbes & Rigobon 
(2002) adjustment of the correlation coefficient and the Corsetti et al. (2002) version of the latter.  
 
2.1.1 The fixed-effect approach 
The first technique we employ is a multivariate test of contagion based on a panel data model which 
controls for common vulnerabilities through the inclusion of a world, regional and emerging equity 
market index. The framework is a basic regression model of the form: 
t i t emerging i t global i t regional i t i t i y , , 3 , 2 , 1 , ε τ β τ β τ β γ α + + + + + = (1)
 
Where  is the return of country  at time  , and  t i y , i t t regional, τ ,  t global, τ and  t emerging, τ are regional, global 
and emerging markets factors, respectively.  The model contains a constant,  i α , for each country 
return vector  and a fixed time effect  i y t γ which is defined for a period a K days through time across 
all countries. As in Baur&Fry (2005), the fixed time effect is interpreted in comparison to a base 
period and capture contagion in this model. The error terms are given by  t i, ε and are assumed to be 
independent and independently distributed with zero mean and unit variance. 
As in Baur & Fry (2005), the model differentiates between common vulnerabilities and contagion 
through the relative importance of the global and regional factors compared to the fixed time effects. It 
is assumed that vulnerabilities exist in both the benchmark and crisis period and capture the systematic 
relationship between the equity markets of each country and the region, emerging markets and the 
world. In this framework, the fixed time effect captures time-varying joint positive and negative 
movements across markets that are unexplained by the loading factors over the period of study. The 
idea is then that contagion occurs wherever these fixed time effects reach a certain threshold, 
highlighting the fact that asset prices are determined by a large unexplained common factor. We consider that the threshold is reached if the t-statistic of an estimate of the fixed effect is significant at 
the 5% level. 
According to Baur&Fry, the advantages of this approach lies in that the model can endogenously 
determine contagion and hence avoid the sample selection bias discussed in Pesaran and Pick (2004). 
Moreover, the panel model is multivariate and therefore gives evidence of joint contagion through an 
estimation of global interdependencies. When investigating contagion in a specific region, it thus 
constitutes a useful complement to the bivariate framework. 
 
2.1.2 The structural model approach 
Favero & Giavazzi (2002) have also proposed a methodology which also allows to endogenously 
define contagion by indentifying many short lived crisis periods associated with extreme returns. The 
idea is to implement a VAR to control for the interdependence between asset returns, and subsequently 
used the heteroscedasticity and nonormalities of the residuals from that VAR to identify unexpected 
shocks transmitted across countries, which are considered as contagion. The first step is to estimate a 
simple VAR and to consider the distribution of the residuals. Crisis observations are then defined 
through a set of dummies associated with extreme residuals for each country. Consider the following 
VAR model: 
t t t v z z + = −1 φ   (2)
 
Where  are pooled asset returns across the sample period,  t z φ  contains the   VAR parameters, 
and  are the reduced-form disturbance with zero means and constant covariance matrix with 
























    Where we define one single dummy variable per observation. These dummy variables are then 
included in the following structural model:  
t t t t t t d d z z z , 1 , 1 , 2 2 , 1 , 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 2 2 , 1 , 1 η γ γ θ α + + + + = −  
t t t t t t d d z z z , 2 , 2 , 2 2 , 1 , 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2 2 , 1 1 , 2 , 2 η γ γ θ α + + + + = −
(4)
 
Where  1 θ  and  2 θ are the parameters on own lags and  t i, η are the structural disturbances. In order to 
correct for simultaneity bias, this model is implemented using an FIML variable estimator where 
instruments are the dummy variables and each country’s own lagged returns. Finally, contagion from 
country 1 to country 2 is tested by checking the significance of the shock in asset returns in the second 
country on asset returns in the first country: 
0 : 2 , 1 0 = γ H  
2.4 Adjusted correlation coefficient 
In a seminal paper, Forbes&Rigobon (2002) pointed out that the traditional comparison of correlation 
coefficient is biased due to heteroscedasticity in market returns during crisis periods. They 
subsequently proposed a methodology to correct for that bias. Consider the basic conditional 





= p  
(5)
 



















δ measures the change in high period volatility against the low period volatility in 
the crisis country. The null hypothesis of no contagion is then tested as: 
0 : 0 = − l h p p H  However, this approach has been criticized by Corsetti et.al(2002) on the basis that it is built on 
arbitrary and unrealistic restrictions on the variance of country-specific shocks. Whereas the 
Forbes&Rigobon (2002) methodology identifies tranquil and crisis periods by different levels of asset 
return volatility, a change in variance might actually be driven by an increase in the variance of a 
common factor, which then causes unusual volatility in other markets. In this case, the event of a 
significant change in the magnitude of co-movement between markets does not necessarily require a 
rise in correlation between these markets; and contagion can be defined as the presence of co-
movements in significant excess from what could be expected from an unchanged transmission 
mechanism. Accordingly, the methodology proposed by Corsetti et.al (2002) consists of testing for 
structural breaks in the international transmission mechanism.  
The model first creates data-generating process in country 1 and country 2, where country 2 is the 
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Where  s ' α are constants,  1 γ and 2 γ are country-specific factor loading,  is a common factor,  f i ε and 



































































































Where and are coefficients for the crisis and tranquil period, respectively. If the transmission 
mechanism is left unchanged between the tranquil and crisis period, 
c p t p
1 γ ,  2 γ , 
























































































λ = . 
 
Testing the null hypothesis of interdependence versus contagion amounts to measuring whether   is 
significantly higher than 
C p
φ , which represents the theoretical measure of interdependence: 
φ ≤
C p H : 0  
In implementing the correlation-based methodology, we draw on two test-statistics to measure the 
significance of the difference between coefficients. Following Forbes & Rigobon (2002) we begin  
with a test based on the Fisher transformation. However, this approach makes the assumption of 
normality, and might suffer from a lack of robustness in the case of skewed stock market returns. In an 
attempt to improve the finite sample properties of the statistic we therefore complement the analysis 















− =  
(10)
 
Where  .  () 4 , 05 . 0 2 1 − + n n t
 
2.2 Data and Identification of crises 
 
                                                 
3 Corsetti et al. (2002) also suggest calculating the test based on threshold values derived from the variance 
ratios. However, this framework requires that studied market display high correlation levels (>0.32) during the 
crisis period, otherwise threshold values tend to infinity and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at all. Results 
are available on request.   We investigate the impact of each of last decade’s majour financial crisis on the emerging markets of 
the Middle East and North Africa. Our analysis thus begins with the 1997-1998 Asian crisis, the 1998 
Russian financial turmoil and its extension to Brazil the same year. We then turn to the 2001 Turkish 
crisis and the Argentinean insolvency crisis in 2002. Following Mishkin and White (2002), who found 
that the US turmoil in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks was among the fifteen biggest crash of 
the century, we also include these terrorists attacks in the crisis timeline. Finally, we also look at the 
effect of the American financial turmoil that followed the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals. 
Serwa and Bohl (2004) highlighted the magnitude of the latter by suggesting that it corresponded to a 
fall of 20% in the US index. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The preliminary step to the investigation of contagion is the accurate identification of the crisis 
interval. This requires to divide the dataset into a stable and a turmoil period. Our starting dates are 
based on the literature, and the length of the turmoil are chosen to be one or two months depending on 
crisis development. Following Rigobon(2001), we assume that the breakout of the East Asian crisis 
can be identified with the dramatic increase of short term interest rates in Hong Kong on October 23, 
1997. The dates for the Russian crisis and its Brazilian sequel are based on the results from 
Rigobon(2001) and Baig and Goldfajn(2001). According to this timeline, the initial shock to the 
Russian bond market took place on August 6, 1998. The stock market reacted one week later and the 
turmoil persisted until the end of September. The Brazilian crisis, which was often associated with 
contagion from the Russian crisis, lasted from the end of November 1998 to January 1999. Following 
Mishkin and White (2002), the starting dates of the two american market crashes are taken from daily 
newspaper. Terrorists acts in New York and Washington took place on September 11, 2001, and 
WorldCom revealed its accounting fraud on June 25, 2002. Dates for the Turkish crisis were selected 
following Alper(2001) and Yeldan(2002), and the duration of the Argentinean crisis is identified 
following Serwa and Bohl(2004).  We used daily dollar stock market returns for Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and 
Israel, as well as for each of the crisis markets. We also use a MENA, a composite emerging market 
and a world benchmark. Data are taken from the S&P/IFCG emerging markets database. For the US 
market we used the MSCI database. The time series ranged from September 1997 to September 2002. 
In order to neutralize the possible impact of different trading days, all series are smoothed using a two-
day moving average filter. 
 
3. Results and Analysis 
We begin our investigation by asking whether the MENA markets are subject to common 
vulnerabilities, making them susceptible to shocks from neighbouring countries. Results of the 
estimation of the fixed time effect are shown in table 2, which reports an R² of 21.47% and an F-
statistic of 37.98 for this model. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The world index which captures global vulnerability, and the MENA benchmark which captures 
regional vulnerabilities are significant with t-values of 2.8 and 8.14 respectively. However, the 
parameter estimate is sensibly higher for the regional benchmark (0.24) than for the global benchmark 
(0,09). According to Fry&Baur (2005) this finding can be explained by the fact that in the case of 
weakly traded markets, regional linkages are more important than world linkages due to the relative 
importance of regional trade linkages as compared to world linkages, which probably emphasize 
financial rather than economic linkages. The emerging market index is unsignificant, which reflects 
both the weak share of the MENA markets in emerging markets total capitalization and their 
segmentation with the world markets. The time series of the fixed time effect over the whole sample 
period, including the seven investigated crisis is presented in figure 1. The first panel of the figure 
presents coefficients estimates and the second panel presents the t-values associated with critical 
values at the 5% significance level. Inspection of this figure shows the absence of joint contagion over 
the period of study, which suggests that the MENA financial markets are not vulnerable to regional realllocation of international portfolios in the event of a international financial crisis. Moreover, 
turning to bivariate results in the event of specific crisis, coefficients obtained from the fisher 
transformation reject the hypothesis of contagion, for each methodology. However, this result suffers 
from a statistical bias as the test relies on the assumption of normality. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Using our refined t-statistic not only provides a more robust testing framework, but also uncovers a 
different story. Taking different methodologies altogether, there is suspicion for contagion for every 
single MENA market in at least one out of the seven crisis episodes. However, results are contrasted 
among countries. Israel and Turkey are the only two markets that we can suspect to have endured 
contagion during the Asian crisis, with the Corsetti framework. Moreover, looking at crisis episodes 
altogether, they also seem to be sample’s most vulnerable markets: besides contagion from the Asian 
crisis, Israel was quite significantly affected by the Turkish crisis, while Turkey seems to have 
endured contagion during each american crisis ((in both correlation-based approaches). Considering 
that Turkey and Israel are the oldest, largest and most developed markets in the MENA, this finding 
can be explained by the fact that contagion requires a high participation of international investors in 
the afflicted markets. 
On the other hand, we find very little evidence of contagion during the Russian, Brazilian, and 
Argentinean crisis. Along with the relative smaller impact of these crisis on the world’s markets, the 
relative small size of the MENA markets and the prevalence of regional trade linkages might explain 
the absence of contagion, as it suggests that the sample countries were immune from balance of 
payment deficits and from the massive capital flights that were implied by the restructuring of 
international portfolios.  
However, we can suspect that Egypt was affected by the Russian crisis (in the structural model 
approach); while Tunisia seems to have been quite significantly affected by the Brazilian crisis (in 
both the Forbes-Rigobon and Favero-Giavazzi approaches). These results might appear uncanny a first 
glance, especially given the small size of the Tunisian market. However, using daily indices in local currencies and a simple Johansen-Juselius methodology, we detect a cointegrating vector between 
each of these markets and our world benchmark. The EMU being these two countries’ main trade 
partner, evidence in favour of interrnational financial integration suggests that contagion did not occur 
due to commercial deficits, but rather through a common creditor effect, or as the result of herding 
behaviours within the framework of pure contagion.   
Finally, another striking fact is that evidence of contagion in the MENA seems to increase over time: 
dropping the Argentinean crisis out of the analysis due to its local impact, and looking at the number 
of contagion relationships per crisis, we yield two relationships during the 1997 Asian crisis, four 
during the 2001 Turkish crisis, and our results culminate with five relationships during the 2002 Enron 
crisis. Turkey and Israel appear early in the analysis, during the Asian crisis. They are followed by 
Egypt and Tunisia during the Russian - Brazilian episode. With the outbreak of the Turkish crisis, 
Morocco and Lebanon join the contagion group, while Jordan is suspected of contagion for the first 
time during the first American crisis. As we move forward in time and new crises occur, additional 
countries are thus suspected of contagion. The decade of study being a period of significant 
developments in the MENA markets, the increase in contagion relationships and the appearance of 
new recipient markets as we move trough time suggest that along with improved resource allocation 




The objective of this paper was to investigate vulnerability to financial contagion in a set of rapidly 
expanding emerging markets of the Middle East and North Africa, during seven episodes of 
international financial crisis. Using Fry & Baur (2005) fixed-effect panel approach, we significantly 
rejected the hypothesis of joint regional contagion, which can be explained by the low levels of 
regional financial integration. However, using a battery of bivariate contagion tests based on Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002), Corsetti (2002), and Favero and Giavazzi (2002), we suspect the presence of 
contagion for Israel and Turkey during the Asian crisis, Egypt and Tunisia during the Russian crisis 
and its Brazilian sequel; Israel, Morocco and Lebanon during the Turkish crisis; Tunisia, Turkey and Jordan during the 9/11/2001 breakdown and Morocco, Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon during the Enron 
scandals. In conformity with the literature, the time-increasing number of countries suggests that the 
probability of being affected by contagion grows as markets develop in size and liquidity, and become 
more integrated to the world’s markets.  
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 Table 1 Comparative Indicators for emerging markets (2003) 
Area  Market  Capitalisation /GDP Liquidity  Listed  Companies 
      
Asia      
India  46.80% 31.97%  5644 
China  25.50% 71.08%  780 
Malaysia  156.00% 32.45%  902 
Hong-Kong  456.10% 41.44%  1037 
Korea  48.50% 156.20%  684 
Philippines  29.20% 11.52%  236 
Taiwan  132.53% 156.10%  674 
      
Average 127.80%  71.50%  1422 
      
   Latin America    
Argentina  27.00% 8.80%  110 
Brazil  45.90% 29.35%  391 
Mexico  19.50% 21.11%  237 
Chile  11.97% 7.70%  240 
Colombia  18.10% 5.65%  108 
Peru  19.90% 10.00%  227 
      
Average 23.70%  13.80%  218 
      
MENA      
Egypt  33.79% 15.61%  967 
Morocco  29.32% 18.72%  52 
Tunisia  10.03% 7.73%  45 
Jordan  110.73% 23.78%  161 
Lebanon  7.91% 8.72%  14 
Israel  67.23% 27.74%  577 
Turkey  29.36% 143.55  285 
      




Source: Federation Internationale des Bourses de Valeur, 2005 
Note: Market Capitalization/GDP is the market capitalization at the end of each year divided 
by GDP for the year 
         Liquidity corresponds to total value traded for the year divided by market capitalization









 Table 2: Crisis Timeline 
 
Crisis name  Crisis country  Stable periods  Crisis periods 
Asian “Flu”  Hong Kong  1997:10:1–1997:10:22 1997:10:23–1997:11:22
Russian “Virus”  Russia  1998:6:6–1998:8:5 1998:8:6–1998:10:5
Brazilian crisis  Brazil  1998:11:1–1998:12:31 1999:1:1–1999:3:1
Turkish collapse  Turkey  2000:12:5–2001:2:14 2001:2:15–2001:3:13
Terrorist acts and economic 
slowdown  U.S.  2001:6:27–2001:8:26 2001:9:14–2001:10:13
Argentinean crisis  Argentina  2001:10:13–2001:12:12 2001:12:27–2002:2:26
Accounting scandals  U.S.  2002:4:25–2002:6:24 2002:6:25–2002:7:24
 
 
Table 3: Estimation Results of equation (1): regional and global vulnerabilities
Indep. Variable  Coefficients  t  P>T 
world_benchmark    0,09  2,8*  0,005 
mena_benchmark   0,24  8,14*  0,000 
rcompo    0,00  0,11  0,911 
_cons   0,00  -0,40  0,69 
R square  0,21    
F(3,9783) 37,98    

















































Tranquil Period  Crisis Period  Fstat Contagion?  t-stat  collins  Contagion? 
Egypt  0,25 0,49  0,28  N  1,81  Y 
Israel  0,44 0,64  0,29  N  1,55  N 
Morocco  0,11 -0,57  0,29  N  -7,06  N 
Jordan  0,18 0,03  -0,76  N  -1,15  N 
Tunisia   0,53 0,25  -0,34  N  -2,23  N 
Lebanon  -0,21 0,08  -0,15  N  2,20  Y 
Turkey  0,29 0,28  -0,02  N  -0,09  N 
Adjusted Correlation Coefficients          
Egypt  0,19 0,37  0,19  N  1,35  N 
Israel  0,35 0,51  0,20  N  1,22  N 
Morocco  0,09 -0,44  0,20  N  -4,68  N 
Jordan  0,13 0,02  -0,56  N  -0,81  N 
Tunisia   0,38 0,18  -0,22  N  -1,57  N 
Lebanon  -0,15 0,05  -0,11  N  1,53  N 
Turkey  0,21 0,20  -0,01  N  -0,06  N 
 
Table 5 Russian Crisis 
Unadjusted Correlation 
Coefficients 
Tranquil Period  Crisis Period  Fstat Contagion?  t-stat  collins  Contagion? 
Egypt  -0,24 0,10  0,34  N  3,26  Y 
Israel  0,21 0,22  0,01  N  0,13  N 
Morocco  0,38 -0,24  0,02  N  -7,28  N 
Jordan  0,01 -0,17  -0,65  N  -1,67  N 
Tunisia   0,44 0,17  -0,30  N  -2,53  N 
Lebanon  0,03 0,0523  -0,18  N  0,17  N 
Turkey  0,36 0,27  -0,09  N  -0,76  N 
Adjusted Correlation Coefficients          
Egypt  -0,17 0,07  0,24  N  2,24  Y 
Israel  0,15 0,16  0,01  N  0,09  N 
Morocco  0,28 -0,17  0,01  N  -4,56  N 
Jordan  0,01 -0,12  -0,46  N  -1,18  N 
Tunisia   0,31 0,12  -0,20  N  -1,77  N 
Lebanon  0,02 0,04  -0,13  N  0,12  N 





 Table 6 Brazilian crisis 
Unadjusted Correlation 
Coefficients 
Tranquil Period  Crisis Period  Fstat Contagion?  t-stat  collins  Contagion? 
Egypt  0,22 -0,08  -0,31  N  -2,43  N 
Israel  -0,06 -0,04  0,02  N  0,17  N 
Morocco  0,03 -0,25  -0,53  N  -2,22  N 
Jordan  0,08 -0,06  -0,29  N  -1,04  N 
Tunisia   -0,26 0,06  0,32  N  2,48  Y 
Lebanon  0,20 -0,31  -0,14  N  -4,52  N 
Turkey  0,10 0,11  0,01  N  0,07  N 
Adjusted Correlation Coefficients          
Egypt  0,16 -0,06  -0,22  N  -1,68  N 
Israel  -0,04 -0,03  0,02  N  0,12  N 
Morocco  0,02 -0,18  -0,38  N  -1,56  N 
Jordan  0,06 -0,04  -0,21  N  -0,73  N 
Tunisia   -0,18 0,04  0,22  N  1,71  Y 
Lebanon  0,15 -0,23  -0,10  N  -3,03  N 
Turkey  0,07 0,08  0,01  N  0,05  N 
 
Table 7 Turkish Crisis 
Unadjusted Correlation 
Coefficients 
Tranquil Period  Crisis Period  Fstat Contagion?  t-stat  collins  Contagion? 
Egypt  0,01 0,13  0,12  N  0,97  N 
Israel  0,12 0,42  0,33  N  2,58  Y 
Morocco  -0,29 0,02  0,17  N  2,68  Y 
Jordan  0,19 0,15  0,32  N  -0,28  N 
Tunisia   0,27 0,10  -0,18  N  -0,47  N 
Lebanon  -0,15 0,0134  -0,04  N  -1,47  N 
Adjusted Correlation Coefficients          
Egypt  0,01 0,09  0,08  N  0,69  N 
Israel  0,09 0,31  0,23  N  1,87  Y 
Morocco  -0,21 0,01  0,12  N  1,85  Y 
Jordan  0,13 0,11  0,22  N  -0,20  N 
Tunisia   0,19 0,07  -0,13  N  -1,04  N 







 Table 8 WTC Attacks 
Unadjusted Correlation 
Coefficients 
Tranquil Period  Crisis Period  Fstat Contagion?  t-stat  collins  Contagion? 
Egypt  0,00 0,12  0,12  N  0,74  N 
Israel  0,54 0,67  0,21  N  0,83  N 
Morocco  -0,34 -0,14  0,22  N  1,30  N 
Jordan  -0,14 0,30  0,45  N  3,11  Y 
Tunisia   -0,11 0,33  0,46  N  3,15  Y 
Lebanon  -0,01 0,18  0,19  N  1,19  N 
Turkey  0,19 0,52  0,39  N  2,23  Y 
Adjusted Correlation Coefficients          
Egypt  0,00 0,08  0,08  N  0,52  N 
Israel  0,44 0,54  0,14  N  0,67  N 
Morocco  -0,24 -0,10  0,15  N  0,92  N 
Jordan  -0,10 0,22  0,32  N  2,13  Y 
Tunisia   -0,08 0,24  0,33  N  2,17  Y 
Lebanon  0,00 0,13  0,13  N  0,84  N 
Turkey  0,14 0,40  0,28  N  1,65  N 
 
Table 9 Argentinean Crisis 
Unadjusted Correlation 
Coefficients 
Tranquil Period  Crisis Period  Fstat Contagion?  t-stat  collins  Contagion? 
Egypt  0,21 0,05  -0,17  N  -1,51  N 
Israel  0,17 0,07  -0,11  N  -0,96  N 
Morocco  -0,27 -0,23  0,26  N  0,36  N 
Jordan  -0,13 -0,42  0,04  N  -2,69  N 
Tunisia   -0,10 0,02  0,12  N  1,05  N 
Lebanon  -0,40 -0,17  -0,31  N  2,17  Y 
Turkey  0,32 -0,11  -0,44  N  -4,27  N 
Adjusted Correlation Coefficients          
Egypt  0,15 0,03  -0,12  N  -1,06  N 
Israel  0,12 0,05  -0,08  N  -0,68  N 
Morocco  -0,19 -0,16  0,17  N  0,26  N 
Jordan  -0,10 -0,31  0,03  N  -1,95  N 
Tunisia   -0,07 0,01  0,08  N  0,74  N 
Lebanon  -0,29 -0,12  -0,22  N  1,52  N 








Table 10 Accounting scandals 
Unadjusted Correlation 
Coefficients 
Tranquil Period  Crisis Period  Fstat Contagion?  t-stat  collins  Contagion? 
Egypt  -0,02 0,12  0,14  N  1,10  N 
Israel  0,54 0,39  -0,19  N  -1,14  N 
Morocco  -0,26 0,10  0,36  N  2,96  Y 
Jordan  0,10 0,36  0,28  N  2,11  Y 
Tunisia   0,01 -0,14  -0,14  N  -1,10  N 
Lebanon  -0,22 0,38  0,63  N  5,89  Y 
Turkey  -0,02 0,36  0,40  N  3,23  Y 
Adjusted Correlation Coefficients          
Egypt  -0,01 0,09  0,10  N  0,78  N 
Israel  0,39 0,29  -0,12  N  -0,84  N 
Morocco  -0,18 0,07  0,26  N  2,03  Y 
Jordan  0,07 0,27  0,20  N  1,51  N 
Tunisia   0,00 -0,10  -0,10  N  -0,78  N 
Lebanon  -0,16 0,28  0,45  N  3,85  Y 





























 Table 11 to 16 : Results from the Favero-Giavazzi analysis 
 
 
Table 11 Asian Crisis 
Country Coefficient  Z  P  Contagion? 
Egypt  0,000 -0,28  0,78  N 
Israel  -0,001 -0,67  0,51  N 
Morocco  0,001 1,25 0,21  N 
Jordan  -0,001 -1,43  0,15  N 
Tunisia   -0,001 -0,26  0,80  N 
Lebanon  0,001 0,95 0,34  N 
Turkey  0,000 -0,14  0,89  N 
 
 
Table 12 Russian Crisis 
Country Coefficient  Z  P  Contagion? 
Egypt  -0,001 -1,25  0,21  N 
Israel  0,000 -0,69  0,49  N 
Morocco  0,000 -1,12  0,26  N 
Jordan  0,000 0,79 0,43  N 
Tunisia   -0,006 -1,77  0,08  N 
Lebanon  0,001 1,62 0,11  N 
Turkey  -0,002 -1,39  0,17  N 
 
 
Table 13 Brazilian Crisis 
Country Coef  Z  P  Contagion? 
Egypt  0,000 -1,07  0,29  N 
Israel  0,000 -0,41  0,68  N 
Morocco  0,000 -1,55  0,12  N 
Jordan  0,000 0,30 0,76  N 
Tunisia   0,000 0,00 0,00  Y 
Lebanon  0,000 0,70 0,48  N 
Turkey  -0,002 -1,19  0,23  N 
 
 
Table 14 Turkish Crisis 
Country Coef  Z  P  Contagion? 
Egypt  0,000 0,36 0,72  N 
Israel  0,000 0,34 0,74  N 
Morocco  0,000 -1,15  0,25  N 
Jordan  0,000 -0,01  1,00  N 
Tunisia   -0,001 -0,19  0,85  N 








 Table 15 US Crisis 
Country Coef  Z  P  Contagion? 
Egypt  0,000    -0,57  0,57  N 
Israel  0,000    -1,27  0,2  N 
Morocco  0,000    0,05  0,96  N 
Jordan  0,000    -0,94  0,35  N 
Tunisia   -0,001    -0,12  0,9  N 
Lebanon  0,000    -1,45  0,15  N 
Turkey  0,000    1,45  0,15  N 
 
 
Table 16 Argentinean Crisis 
Country Coef  Z  P  Contagion? 
Egypt  0,000 -0,48  0,63  N 
Israel  -0,002 -1,83  0,07  N 
Morocco  0,000 -0,29  0,77  N 
Jordan  0,000 -0,57  0,57  N 
Tunisia   0,001 0,00 0,19  N 
Lebanon  -0,001 -0,88  0,38  N 





































 Table 17 to 23: Results from the Corsetti methodology 
 
 
Table 17 Asian Crisis 
Country  Tranquil  Period  Crisis Period  F stat  Contagion?  t-statistic  Contagion? 
Egypt  0,05 0,09  0,05  N  0,36  N 
Israel  0,16 0,41  0,28  N  1,97  Y 
Morocco  0,03 0,17  0,14  N  1,08  N 
Jordan  0,10 0,01  -0,08  N  -0,57  N 
Tunisia   0,02 0,06  0,03  N  0,24  N 
Lebanon  0,20 0,19  0,01  N  0,04  N 
Turkey  0,02 0,37  0,37  N  2,85  Y 
 
 
Tableau 18 Russian Crisis 
Country  Tranquil Period  Crisis Period  F stat  Contagion?  t-statistic  Contagion? 
Egypt  0,05 0,09  0,03  N  0,26  N 
Israel  0,23 0,378487  0,11  N  0,87  N 
Morocco  0,07 0,22  0,13  N  1,20  N 
Jordan  0,12 0,08  -0,06  N  -0,54  N 
Tunisia   0,01 0,02  0,00  N  -0,01  N 
Lebanon  0,07 0,06  -0,03  N  -0,29  N 
Turkey  0,35 0,34  -0,10  N  -0,75  N 
 
 
Table 19 Brazilian Crisis 
Country  Tranquil Period  Crisis Period  F stat  Contagion?  t-statistic  Contagion? 
Egypt  0,00 0,13  0,13  N  1,18  N 
Israel  0,10 0,17  0,16  N  1,41  N 
Morocco  0,02 0,11  0,11  N  0,97  N 
Jordan  0,00 0,11  0,11  N  0,96  N 
Tunisia   0,00 0,01  0,01  N  0,06  N 
Lebanon  0,04 0,00  0,00  N  -0,02  N 
Turkey  0,09 0,01  0,00  N  -0,01  N 
 
 
Table 20 Turkish Crisis 
Country  Tranquil Period  Crisis Period  F stat  Contagion?  t-statistic  Contagion? 
Egypt  0,01 0,07  0,07  N  0,60  N 
Israel  0,02 0,26  0,26  N  2,19  Y 
Morocco  0,00 0,19  0,19  N  1,56  N 
Jordan  0,01 0,11  0,11  N  0,94  N 
Tunisia   0,00 0,12  0,12  N  0,98  N 








 Table 21 WTC Attacks 
Country  Tranquil Period  Crisis Period  F stat  Contagion?  t-statistic  Contagion? 
Egypt  0,10 0,07  -0,05  N  -0,34  N 
Israel  0,22 0,41  0,16  N  0,93  N 
Morocco  0,24 0,14  -0,15  N  -0,93  N 
Jordan  0,07 0,36  0,29  N  1,83  Y 
Tunisia   0,03 0,11  0,07  N  0,44  N 
Lebanon  0,10 0,27  0,16  N  0,95  N 




Table 22 Argentinean Crisis 
Country  Tranquil Period  Crisis Period  F stat  Contagion?  t-statistic  Contagion? 
Egypt  0,07 0,07  0,00  N  -0,02  N 
Israel  0,26 0,24  -0,02  N  -0,18  N 
Morocco  0,09 0,03  -0,06  N  -0,54  N 
Jordan  0,06 0,12  0,06  N  0,51  N 
Tunisia   0,01 0,01  0,00  N  -0,03  N 
Lebanon  0,19 0,05  -0,14  N  -1,26  N 




Table 23 Enron Crisis 
Country  Tranquil Period  Crisis Period  F stat  Contagion?  t-statistic  Contagion? 
Egypt  0,01 0,05  0,04  N  0,29  N 
Israel  0,42 0,36  -0,08  N  -0,55  N 
Morocco  0,11 0,10  -0,02  N  -0,13  N 
Jordan  0,01 0,31  0,31  N  2,43  Y 
Tunisia   0,00 0,03  0,03  N  0,23  N 
Lebanon  0,16 0,29  0,13  N  0,99  N 





Table 24 Cointegrating relationships 
 
Vector Trace  Statistic 
Egypt-World   65.292** 
Tunisia-World 131.457** 
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